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An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts 
Summary 
This paper explores the use of a micro-economic model to analyse the provisions and 
parties of bioprospecting contracts. It focuses on the pharmaceutical industry as the 
representative biodiversity buyer, presenting an original theoretical framework that 
explains the main contract characteristics or stylised facts. Against this background, it 
considers the main contractors involved in these private contracts, i.e. biodiversity 
sellers and biodiversity buyers, analysing both the magnitude and distribution of the 
respective payoffs. Particular attention is devoted to the different, mixed impacts of 
bioprospecting contracts and patenting on social welfare. The positive welfare impacts 
delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a 
new drug product, i.e. productivity gains, non-monetary benefit-sharing or transfers and 
royalty revenues. The negative welfare impact results from the legal creation of a 
monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the 
potential redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective 
may jeopardise the desirability of the contracts since this action would lead to a 
significant increase in the transaction costs. 
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1.  Introduction  
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), launched after the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992, clarified and recognised the sovereign property rights of each country over their own 
biodiversity resources. The CBD has stated the important legal principle: each country has 
sovereign property rights over the biodiversity within its jurisdiction, and is able to obtain truthful 
information about the use of genetic resources, to control the access procedures and to equitably 
negotiate the benefit-sharing items with the biodiversity prospectors.  
By attempting to rule out open access to bioprospecting
1, the CBD (1992) has established an 
important legal and economic principle: biodiversity conservation has a (market and non market) 
value. Therefore, biodiversity value can be negotiated with and embodied into some kind of 
governance structures.  
Within the framework of this new institutional context, the result has been a remarkable 
increase in the number of bio-prospecting contracts between the Biodiversity Buyers (BB), notably 
linked to the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Glaxo), and Biodiversity Sellers (BS), mainly local 
research institutes operating in geographical areas where a broad range of biodiversity is present 
(e.g. INBio in Costa Rica). In addition, the number of international institutions (e.g. ICBG) 
involved in sample-screening activities has been observed to increase (Bhat 1999; Ten Kate and 
Laird 1999; Dedeurwaerdere 2005). 
Starting from this background, the present paper contains an economic analysis of 
bioprospecting contracts. In particular, we adopt an inductive method that aims at a careful reading 
and understanding of a selection of existing bioprospecting contracts. We then adopt standard 
microeconomic analysis in order to define the contractors’ objective functions. This is preliminary 
to deriving original insights that help to capture and understand the main motivations of the 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of the study at issue, bioprospecting is defined as the set of activities aiming at collecting, sampling 
and screening genetic resources, including plants, animals, micro-organisms, as well as sharing indigenous knowledge 
with significant potential to develop new market products.  3
stakeholders involved in the bioprospecting negotiation. We focus on explaining the “why” of 
bioprospecting contracts and parties by scrutinising the provisions of selected bioprospecting 
contracts in order to understand the way parties organise their transactions.  
This is important because “understanding how and why economic agents use contracts to 
coordinate their activities is crucial to understanding the organization and efficiency of economic 
exchange” (Masten and Saussier, 2002, p. 273)  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides insights into the pharmaceutical industry 
characteristics and bioprospecting activities. Section 3 contains a review of a number of existing 
contracts worldwide in order to identify their main provisions and parties, and to interpret the 
contracts from the perspective of transaction costs theory. Section 4 presents an original theoretical 
framework that explains the observed and reviewed stylised facts so as to study the different 
steering forces involved in the two parties’ objective functions. Section 5 includes a welfare 
analysis of the bioprospecting contracts and patenting. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Pharmaceutical Research and Bioprospecting Contracts: Some Background 
Information  
Despite alternative definitions and clarifications available in the literature
2, in this article the 
pharmaceutical research process will be defined in terms of a set of discrete steps including: (1) 
field collection of genetic resources, (2) drug discovery, and (3) drug development – see Figure 1. It 
is important to note that the last step of pharmaceutical research, with regard to drug development, 
is the internal research and development (R&D) activity carried out by the pharmaceutical 
companies. The inputs of the R&D process, in the form of screened samples, are normally 
                                                 
2 For example, according to Kate and Laird, pharmaceutical research refers to the “process of discovering, developing, 
and bringing to market new ethical drug products” (ten Kate and Laird, 1999, pp. 49).  4
purchased from another party involved in the first two steps, i.e. field collection of genetic resources 
and drug discovery. 
  
 
To distinguish these two parties, we name them biodiversity buyer (BB) and biodiversity seller 
(BS), respectively. In this context, bioprospecting contracts play an important role in bringing 
together the BB and BS in a legal negotiation framework, so as to complete the entire 
pharmaceutical research process. The following sub-sections will discuss these three steps and the 
associated bioprospecting activities, and will explore the role of bioprospecting contracts.  
 
 
2.1.  Field collection of genetic resources 













































Figure 1 Pharmaceutical research and bioprospecting contract 
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The general conditions for the collection of genetic resources are negotiated between source 
suppliers
3 and BS. This agreement explicitly clarifies a set of mutually agreed upon terms: (a) the 
access to and the use of genetic resources in the source country, which is subject to the Prior 
Informed Consent (PIC) and benefit-sharing treaty, and (b) the restricted manner in which field 
collection and follow-up research will be conducted. The outcome of the field collection will be 
further elaborated by the BS, who are granted exclusive access to the genetic resource, while patent 
rights cover their discoveries in the area under consideration. In many cases, BS refer to local 
research institutes or universities. This geographical affinity contributes to the establishment of a 
firm or of a close relationship with the national or local government in the source country. As a 
matter of fact, these same institutions are often involved in bioprospecting contract negotiations 
with international pharmaceutical industries, on behalf of the source country. As we can see in 
Figure 2, genetic resources have an important role in the discovery of new natural drugs or in 
serving as a source of leads for synthesising new compound structures or products (Ten Kate and 
Laird 2000; Onaga 2001).  
In addition to the local BS mentioned above, in Table 1 we can identify major international 
institutes that have been involved in biocontracting as biodiversity sellers. In this context 
international BS contribute to generating additional funding for bioprospecting projects and to 
supplying technical assistance in capacity-building to the source suppliers. Moreover, as far as 
benefit-sharing rules are concerned, the transfer of technology from the BS to the source suppliers 
contributes to strengthening the research ability and efficiency of the source-based institutes. In 
effect, we can observe a potential increase in the added-value of genetic resources. Furthermore, 
another important characteristic is that many international research organisations (such as ICBG) 
                                                 
3 Source suppliers refer to the stakeholders located in source countries that originally have property rights over genetic 
resources and/or indigenous knowledge. They are important suppliers of raw genetic materials for BS to achieve drug 
discovery process. However, their cooperating relationship is usually established by a number of informal agreements 
or authorisation procedures rather than a legal contact, as in most cases BS are national research institutions located in 
the source countries. For this reason they receive financial support from the local government to conduct the 
fundamental research related to biodiversity. This condition will be further illustrated in section 4 by means of a review 
of bioprospecting contracts.   6
carry out several research programs in different countries. For this reason, the research results and 
database generated in all collaborative countries will be shared within the involved institutes. As a 
consequence, the sharing of systematic information on processing genetic resources can contribute 
to reducing the financial costs of field collection assumed by companies and institutes. In other 
words, it will be possible to provide higher quality samples or synthetic compounds, or obtain the 
same sample processing results with a lower field collection effort, and thus reduce the pressure of 
habitat loss and species extinction. (ICBG 1997; Rausser and Small 2000). 
 
         





Figure 2 The contribution of natural products to pharmaceutical research 
                          Source: Ten Kate and Laird 1999 (adapted). 
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Drug discovery refers to the set of fundamental research activities carried out by the BS, including 
the processing of extracts and the screening of samples. The expected output of these activities is 
the identification of active compounds and their chemical structure, exploring their potential value 
in pharmaceutical products. As shown in Figure 2, the novel compounds derived from the collected 
samples can directly contribute to a new natural drug on the market. However, most of the collected 
genetic materials will serve as a source of leads for drug development (see Section 2.3), and will be 
closely related to the success in drug R&D. For example, high quality samples are helpful for 
discovering valuable research leads, which will increase the efficiency of innovation activities (i.e. 
increase the probability of generating a successful market product with R&D). In addition, research 
leads derived from high quality samples can provide adequate taxonomical, geographical, and 
ecological information, and can consequently increase the productivity of discoveries, reduce the 
need of new field collection, and ultimately result in a decrease in searching costs. Therefore, it is 
not difficult to conclude that for a pharmaceutical company (i.e. BB), it is not necessary to carry out 
drug discovery research by itself, but it does matter to select a good collaborator (i.e. BS), who is 
able to do the best job in sample extracting and screening. Generally speaking, the criteria taken 
into account by companies include inter alia the ability of the biodiversity sellers in providing 
biologically and chemically diverse samples, the simplicity and legislation of the process to obtain 
samples, and the prices of the samples (see Ten Kate and Laird 2000 for more details). The 
cooperation relationship can be established within a legal framework (i.e. bioprospecting contract) 
upon a number of commonly agreed items, including the exchanged commodities (i.e. processed 
genetic resources) and the benefit-sharing regimes, covering both monetary and non-monetary 
benefits – see  Table 1.  
In a formal bioprospecting contract, we can observe a direct monetary payment transferred from 
the pharmaceutical companies to biodiversity sellers (or sample suppliers) in the form of sample  8
fees
4, advanced payments, milestone payments and the royalties (see Ten Kate and Laird 1999, for 
more details). In this case, it is important to note that the price of genetic resources increases when 
the collected material is subject to additional screening and processing activities performed by the 
biodiversity seller. In short, biodiversity sellers can be responsible for the creation of market added-
value to the originally extracted genetic resources. In addition, an advanced payment is undertaken 
for compensating the general operational cost of the research institutes. A milestone payment is 
required when new discoveries are made in the research and development (R&D) phase. In many 
cases, a royalty is also calculated based on the net sales for commercialised products. Obviously, 
the amount of milestone and royalty payments depends upon the success in R&D.  
In addition, the non-monetary payment (e.g. technology transfer and capacity-building) incurred 
by pharmaceutical companies is widely recognised to be far more important than the financial 
benefits from bioprospecting activities obtained by BS, in particular the local BS in the source 
country  (Rosenthal et al. 1999; Ten Kate and Laird 2000; Onaga 2001). By collaborating with 
international pharmaceutical industries, these BS can enhance their scientific database and 
biotechnology in sample screening via a set of non-monetary benefit-sharing terms in the contract, 
including technology transfer, internal personnel training, capacity-building, and sharing of research 
results and biological databases.  
For instance, sharing databases on the indigenous genetic resource and chemical structure of the 
samples provided by the BS can directly provide useful, valuable information for the efficient 
design of future sample guidelines. In other words, this contributes to fine-tuning the scope sample 
collection activities, saving money by avoiding unnecessary field collection for genetic resources. 
Moreover, the shared technology can improve the overall sample quality when it is applied to 
sample extraction and screening. This will not only contribute to increasing the probability of 
                                                 
4  According to Artuso (2002), the value of raw biological material as an input in the research or production of these 
products is significantly lower than the value of finished products containing or derived from biochemical resources.   9
generating success in drug discovery, but also to enhancing the long-term benefits for biodiversity 
sellers due to the increasing added-value of each sample.  
 
2.3.Drug development 
Drug development is usually carried out by the pharmaceutical companies (i.e. the BB) and it is 
based on pharmaceutical research efforts or commitments (see Figure 1). The first target is to 
discover productive research leads, associating their role to the reduction of production costs. 
Another target refers to the greater probability of success in developing a new drug. In both cases, 
research and innovation activities contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the private 
company and its products. 
Some authors argue that the innovation capability is closely dependent on the research capacity 
of individual companies as well as on their additional investments in R&D processes (DiMasi et al. 
1991; Ten Kate and Laird 1999). The latter, however, requires a strong financial commitment by 
private companies. Empirical analyses of the estimated R&D costs to develop new drugs consist of 
the costs related to on-going discovery and development activities, as well as of the costs of failed 
projects (DiMasi et al. 1991; Simpson et al. 1996). Recent calculation indicates that the largest 
companies spend more than a billion dollars per year on pharmaceutical research and development 
activities (ICBG 1997). Finally, in the scenario where R&D is found to be successful, the private 
company incurs additional costs to apply for approval from the regulatory agency, and royalties.  
Independently of the sum of R&D investment, one cannot ex ante guarantee the marketable 
success of each research lead. Instances like INBio and ICBG projects, and marine bioprospecting 
projects all point out that the current sampling and synthesis techniques are very expensive 
processes with limited success. Similar findings obtained by Polski (2005) indicate that, in the U.S., 
on average 10 years are needed to bring a new drug to market at a cost of 800 million dollars. Large 
amounts of money are spent on research and development, in which only one every 5,000  10
compounds may be identified and marketed as a drug. Finally, less than 15% of all drugs can 
generate revenues large enough to compensate the cost of research development (Polski 2005; 
Standard and Poor’s Corporation 2003).  
If, however, the R&D succeeds, the private company receives large monetary returns from the 
successful new commercial product. According to the 1994 statistics of the International 
Development Research Centre, many of the most commonly used drugs in Western medicine are 
derived from tropical plants and are worth 32 billion dollars a year in sales worldwide (Merson 
2000). In 2002, an estimated 2.4 billion dollars were obtained from global sales of marine 
biotechnology products (Ruth 2006). This is one of the main incentives for big industries that are 
keen on investing in bio-prospecting, and that keep land aside for the conservation of the genetic 
resources for future research.  
 
2.4. The role of Patenting or Intellectual Property Rights  
The issue regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) is central to the debate concerning the 
utilisation of genetic resources and their derivatives in bioprospecting contracts. In pharmaceutical 
research in particular, the clear definition of intellectual property rights is essential to facilitate 
R&D collaboration and to protect knowledge before the formalisation of technology exchange 
arrangements, so that the security, distribution and exploitation of the initial inventions can be 
guaranteed by legislations (Thumm 2005). 
It is clear that high quality research leads, derived from the extraction, processing and screening 
activities provided by biodiversity sellers, are the key elements driving the evolution of 
pharmaceutical research in the context of bioprospecting. As a matter of fact, pharmaceutical 
research on natural products, according to some authors ( e.g. Simpson et al. 1996), is more often 
intended to develop “leads” than to identify natural products. Moreover, the IPR on the novel 
compounds and chemical structures discovered in pharmaceutical research are always associated  11
with the patenting rights on their downstream applications by the contractual partners. This requires 
biodiversity sellers to protect the IPR over their new discoveries, and to guarantee the benefits in 
the form of royalty payments arising from their patented innovations. The royalty payments can 
therefore be interpreted as the economic price to use the patented research leads and biochemical 
compounds.   
In addition, for the pharmaceutical industry alone, there are significant incentives involved in 
patenting their product innovations so as to protect past investment efforts and fend off market 
competitors, e.g. free riders. Generally speaking, internal R&D is a costly activity associated with 
high risks. Some figures have shown that although there is only a slim probability (about 10 of 
10000) that synthesised chemical compounds are successful as market products, pharmaceutical 
companies have to patent each compound in view of the fact that it might lead to the next 
blockbuster (Cardinal and Hatfield 2000). Pharmaceutical companies therefore have an increasing 
need for Intellectual Property Protection so as to obtain high revenues from their new drugs to make 
up for their large investment efforts and to deal with potential new competitors in the market. In the 
next section, we shall discuss the role of patenting in more detail. 
The effects of IPR have to be analysed from two points of view. On the one hand, patent rights 
grant the holder exclusion power from research or exclusion power from the market. They 
encourage the creation of new, economically valuable knowledge and increase competitiveness 
within an appropriate regulatory framework (Musu 2005; Thumm 2005). On the other hand, many 
critics believe that the patent system creates entry barriers and overly strong monopoly positions, 
thus hindering the development of new knowledge (Lawson 2004; Musu 2005; Thumm 2005). In 
the remaining body of the paper, we attempt to apply a formal economic analysis so as to identify 
the different patenting schemes involved in pharmaceutical bioprospecting contracts and their 
economic impacts on stakeholders’ objective functions, the overall level of genetic resource 
protection and human welfare.  12
 
3. Bioprospecting Contracts: Some Stylised Facts 
The paragraph provides an overview of a selection of existing bioprospecting contracts and an 
economic analysis of the most important provisions. Stylised facts show that the most frequently 
adopted governance structure is represented by long-term contracts, mostly signed between public 
research institutions and biotechnological- pharmaceutical multinationals, all over the world.  
A well-known presented case is, for instance, the bioprospecting contract between the INBio-
national biodiversity institute of Costa Rica, and Merck Pharmaceutical Ltd. in 1991. Merck was 
granted the right to evaluate the commercial prospects of a limited number of plant, insect, and 
microbial samples collected in Costa Rica’s 11 conservation areas, from which INBio gained US$1 
million over two years and equipment for processing samples and scientific training from Merck. In 
addition, the agreement addressed a share of potential royalties and technology transfer to develop 
local sample preparation and screening capabilities. INBio agreed to invest 10% of all the payments 
and half of the royalties by Merck into the Conservation Areas (Mulholland and Wilman 1998; 
Merson 2000; Nunes and Bergh 2001; Artuso 2002). This kind of agreement leads to different 
interests in genetic resources, crucial input for research and development (R&D), and thus results in 
different contractual specifications. For instance, industries of botanical medicines, personal care 
and commercial agriculture traditionally depend upon plant genetic resources, but biotechnological 
companies and pharmaceutical companies always acquire material as raw samples, extracts from 
plant genetic resources or ‘value-added’ genetic resources (Ten Kate and Laird 1999; 2000).  




Table 1 A review on the existing bioprospecting contracts 
Contractors and Legal 









R&D, Patenting  and Biodiversity 
Protection Obligations 
Other Obligations 
INBio  (national 
biodiversity institute of 











- Royalties Sharing  
-Technology transfer to develop 
local preparations and screening 
capabilities 
- Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 
to protect biodiversity 
No Exclusive 
contracts 








& Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
Monsanto, and Glaxo 
Wellcome (consortium 
of private companies) 
1993        





-  No Royalties Sharing  
-  No technology transfer to 
develop local preparations and 
screening 
- Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 
to protect biodiversity 
No Exclusive 
contracts 




Gardens (EU public 
institutions) 
& U.S. Phytera (private 









- Royalties Sharing 
-  No technology transfer to 
develop local preparations and 
screening  
- No Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 
to protect biodiversity 
Exclusive contracts 
- Common use of 
the resource 
 
TBGRI  (Tropical 
Botanical Garden and 




& Arya Vaidya 
Pharmacy Coimbator Ltd 
(private company)  
 
1996         




- Royalties Sharing  
-Technology transfer to develop 
local preparations and screening 
capabilities. Investment in the Kani 
Community for human capital 
formation 
- Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 
to protect biodiversity 
Exclusive contracts 




Park (U.S. public 
institution) 
& Diversa (private 
company) 
1997        




Royalties Sharing  
- No Technology transfer to 
develop local preparation and 
screening capabilities. 
- No Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 




- Common use of 
the resource 
  14
Table 1 A review on the existing bioprospecting contracts (cont.) 
 
Contractors and Legal 









R&D, Patenting  and Biodiversity 
Protection Obligations 
Other Obligations 
CSIR (The Bio/Chemtek 
division of South 
Africa’s Commission on 
Scientific and Industrial 
Research, public 
institution) & Diversa 
(private company)  
1998 





No Royalties Sharing  
Technology transfer to develop 
local preparations and screening 
capabilities for traditional healers  
No Obligation for the private 
company to financially contribute 
to protect biodiversity 
 
Exclusive contracts 





& Glaxo Wellcome 
(private company) 
 







Technology transfer to develop 
local preparation and screening 
capabilities 
Obligation for the private company 





- Common use of 
the resource 
 
Department of Chemistry  
University of South 
Pacific (public 
institution) 
& Smith Kline Beecham 
(private company) 




Non Monetary  Royalties Sharing 
Technology transfer to develop 
local preparation and screening 
capabilities. Investment in the 
Verata Community for human 
capital formation 
Obligation for the private company 




- Common use of 
the resource 
 
Sources: (Breibart 1997; ICBG 1997; Mulholland and Wilman 1998; Neto and Dickson 1999; Ten Kate and Laird 
1999; Merson 2000; Artuso 2002; Greer and Harvey 2004; Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2005) 
 
Though very different in peculiarities, the selected contracts present a set of common features 
and provisions.  
First, despite the various entities of the existing bioprospecting contracts, and the wide range of 
stakeholders, it is possible to identify two main parties to the agreement.  
1)  Biodiversity Sellers (BS)  are generally public institutions of various types (e.g. botanic 
gardens, universities, research institutions, and gene banks). The BS have an important role  15
as contractors with the (pharmaceutical) private companies, since they serve private 
companies with the screened samples, novel compounds and discovered research leads 
derived from their field collections in association with the appropriate freedom for new drug 
development. In addition, they are responsible for obtaining a granted permission of access 
to genetic resources, or indigenous knowledge, and collaborate with the private companies 
in the development and marketing of these resources. In doing this, they have to enter into 
separate contracts or other agreements with both source suppliers and private companies. In 
addition, BS (formally or informally) negotiate with the source suppliers
5 so as to obtain the 
permission to exploit the access to the genetic resource. Such permission, therefore, enables 
BS to conduct field collection. 
2)   Biodiversity Buyers (BB) are mostly pharmaceutical multinational companies and represent 
another contractual party. This stakeholder is characterised by its notable research and 
development (R&D) efforts on the commercial use of the genetic resources. Although 
various private companies build their business on the commercialisation of genetic 
resources, the pharmaceutical industry undoubtedly represents the largest global market. 
Some figures indicate that global sales of pharmaceuticals are estimated to exceed $300 
billion per annum. The component of sales derived from genetic resources or pure natural 
products accounts for some $75-150 billion (Grifo et al. 1997; Ten Kate and Laird 1999). 
Pharmaceutical multinational companies invest a higher proportion of their sales in R&D 
than most other industries, such as botanical medicines, personal care, commercial 
agriculture, and crop protection companies, but they also incur a higher risk in drug 
discovery and development process (See Table 2). For this reason, pharmaceutical 
                                                 
5 Source suppliers have been defined in section 2. This group formally consists of source countries’ governments, local 
management entities and indigenous people/communities (e.g. the Kanis), some of which have the ability to grant 
permission for the access to, and use of, genetic resources and their derivatives, such as the national 
governments/organisations(e.g. Brazilian Extracta). Source suppliers also include the stakeholder groups that have 
access to traditional knowledge, on the basis of which the private companies may directly profit or make new and 
improved products (e.g. CSIR South Africa). For further information, see Nunes et al. (2006). 
  16
companies play a crucial role as steering engines in driving the progress of bioprospecting 
contracts. The next section focuses on the economic analysis of the pharmaceutical industry 
only, where the stakeholders originally referred to as BB will represent the pharmaceutical 
companies/industry. 
 
Table 2 Comparison of duration and cost of typical research and development programmes in 
different industry sectors. 
Sector  Years to develop   Cost (US$ m) 
Pharmaceutical  10-15 or more  231-500 
Botanical medicines  Less than 2 to 5  0.15-7 
Commercial agricultural seed 
Transgene 
8 to12 
4 or more 
1-2.5 
35-75 
Ornamental horticulture  1 to 20 or more  0.05-5 
Crop Protection  2 to 5 (biocontrol agent) 
8 to 14 (chemical pesticide) 
1-5 
40-100 
Industrial enzymes  2 to 5  2-20 
Personal care and cosmetic  Less than 2 to 5  0.15-7 
Source: Ten Kate and Laird 1999, page 9 
 
Second, the agreements’ core provision is an exchange obligation: parties trade the possibility to 
get screened samples of biological material in exchange for a monetary payment (in some cases this 
is not due) and some other mutual obligations.  There are three essential contractual obligations:  
1)  the possibility (or not) to share royalty revenues if the pharmaceutical multinationals patent a 
new drug discovery thanks to the R&D activities performed on the genetic material sold in 
the contract;   17
2)  the possibility (or not) for the pharmaceutical multinationals to transfer R&D technology  
and screening capabilities to the local institutions; and/or the possibility (or not) to train (?) 
local human capital; 
3)  the possibility (or not) for the pharmaceutical multinationals to financially contribute to 
protect biodiversity with the partial transfer of the royalty revenues.   
Moreover, contracts generally include ancillary provisions like the possibility to share the use of the 
resource and the attribution (or not) of exclusive exploitation rights. 
Third, all the contracts are long-term and (mostly) renewable. This contractual feature is well 
explained by Transaction Cost Economics
6 (TCE) that acknowledges the role of contract terms in ex 
ante aligning marginal incentives and in preventing wasteful efforts to ex post redistribution of 
existing surplus. In order to achieve this twofold objective, contract terms have several dimensions 
(price provisions; incompleteness level; duration) that allow the transaction(s) at stake to adapt to 
the regulated contingencies and circumstances. From this perspective, long-term contracts represent 
the most effective cost-minimising structure to govern transactions. When uncertainty, complexity 
and asset specificity
7 are significant, internal organisation (and/or long-term contracts) is likely to 
                                                 
6 Firms and markets are different, alternative governance structures and the existence of one or the other depends on 
how transaction costs are minimised. Transaction costs characterise market activities (a transaction is defined as any use 
of the market, whether for buying or selling). “There is a cost of using the price mechanism. By forming an organisation 
and allowing some authority (an entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved”. The 
essential reasoning presented by Coase (1937) is an equilibrium condition: “a firm will tend to expand until the cost of 
organising an extra transaction within the firm becomes equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by 
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm.” 
In Williamson’s framework (1975, 1979, 1983, 1985), there is no simple dichotomy between market transactions and 
internal organisation. Rather, there is a continuum, with simple spot market transactions at one extreme, internal 
organisation (horizontal and vertical) at the other, and a wide range of more complicated contractual relationships in 
between. Transaction costs depend on transactions uncertainty, opportunistic behaviour, asset specificity and bounded 
rationality 
7 Williamson identifies four types of asset-specificity:  
1. site-specificity: once sited the assets are very immobile.  
2. physical asset specificity: when parties make investments in machinery or equipment that are specific to a 
certain transaction and these have lower values in alternative uses.  
3. dedicated assets: general investment by a supplier or buyer that would otherwise not be made but for the 
prospect of transacting a specific (large) amount an item with a particular partner. If the contract is prematurely 
terminated, the supplier (who invested) would be with excess capacity/ the buyer would be with unexpected 
excess demand.  
4. human asset specificity: workers’ acquired skills, know-how and information that is more valuable inside a 
particular transaction than outside it.   18
be a superior arrangement for governing transactions. On the contrary, the market will represent the 
most efficient form of governance, when uncertainty and asset specificity are not important and 
transactions are not complex. In this case, contract terms are simple and approximate spot market 
transactions.  
According to the TCE approach, the contracting parties involved in a specific relationship use 
vertical integration and long-term contracts to limit ex post bargaining inefficiencies due to hold-up, 
thereby minimising the resulting loss in ex ante investment. This approach predicts a positive 
correlation between vertical integration (and/or long-term contracts) and the degree of relation 
specificity. Vertical integration should enhance both parties’ investments positively in the TCE 
approach.   
Bioprospecting activities are certainly characterised by high levels of asset specificity, in 
particular site specificity, since particular genetic materials are sited in particular locations, and 
dedicated assets, since the pharmaceutical companies invest in bioprospecting to exploit the 
possibility of patenting new discoveries. In addition, bioprospecting is characterised by a high level 
of uncertainty, because firms investing in R&D are uncertain of the probability of new drug 
discoveries. Finally, bioprospecting is characterised by high levels of complexity, because it is an 
activity generating several (positive and negative) impacts on biodiversity exploitation, on research, 
on innovation, on firms’ competitiveness, on wealth redistribution.  
Long-term contracts represent a way to minimise transaction costs, generated by uncertainty, 
asset specificity and complexity in bioprospecting. Moreover, long-term contracts minimise 
bureaucratic and administrative transaction costs that could be generated by other organisational 
forms (public tenders, public authorisations implemented by countries with sovereign property 
rights over the biodiversity within their jurisdiction), thus providing proper incentives  for 
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pharmaceutical multinationals to invest in R&D, and bringing along the benefits prescribed for the 
CBD. 
Finally, the contracts prescribe for the payment of a biodiversity price, whose amount and 
payment scheme is different in every contract
8. For example, Merck paid US$ 1,135 (correct?) 
million to INBio for the supply and screening of samples, while U.S. Phytera agreed to pay $15 per 
plant to the EU botanical gardens. In addition, the parties agree to share (in different proportions) 
the returns of the royalties should the bioprospecting activities generate a drug and thus obtain a 
discovery patent. Some other contracts do not provide for monetary transfers (for instance, the 
collaboration between the traditional healers and CSIR in bioprospecting has only promoted the 
development of a data base of information on the traditional uses of South African plants, which 
can help CSIR and its partners to make a preferential selection on the plants for screening. 
Moreover, a formal agreement grants the application of benefit-sharing arrangements among the 
contractors. 
    
4. Modelling Bioprospecting Contracts 
This section provides a theoretical economic perspective to identify, characterise and discuss the 
interrelationships between contractors which are governed by bioprospecting contracts. The setting 
and setup of the contracts is interpreted as a key element in revealing the underlying motivations 
that induce the interested parties to subscribe to bioprospecting. As a consequence, the contract 
improves our understanding of the strategic behaviour of contractors, and ultimately allows us to 
evaluate the performance of bioprospecting contracts.  
Bioprospecting contracts aim at ensuring the exclusive access to the genetic resources, based 
upon the equitable and fair sharing of the benefits between the involved parties. This access can be 
                                                 
8 In a TCE approach, the contract price reflects the parties’ evaluation of the contract 
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facilitated by a set of other accessory negotiations (for instance, authorisations/or collateral 
agreements concerning the provision, or transfer, of the samples, chemical compounds and genetic 
information derived from extracting and screening activities in the research institutes or 
universities) with third interested parties (for instance local populations).  
It therefore links the biodiversity sellers with the private companies through a set of mutual 
agreements on the sharing of both monetary and non-monetary benefits on the use of genetic 
materials and their derivatives.  
Originally, collection, discovery and development were sequential processes in pharmaceutical 
research, but they now tend to be conducted in parallel by both the pharmaceutical industry and 
some collaborative institutions in order to reduce the development time. The industry alone is 
responsible for conducting the drug development, but sometimes requires the biodiversity sellers 
(that usually are public research institutions in the source country) to complete the fundamental 
research for drug discovery, including the field collection, establishment of screening libraries, and 
discovery of active compounds for pharmaceutical research. Hence, pharmaceutical companies are 
legally entitled to the exclusive use of the given samples in association with the freedom of 
developing these samples into natural products, research leads or synthetic compounds for new drug 
discovery.  
In the present study, we attempt to provide a formal analysis of the bioprospecting contract, by 
highlighting the objective functions and objective function maximisation of the two main parties, in 
order to provide a primer theoretical structure to the contract and to analyse the main (market) 
impacts (for a theoretical study of contracts in the electricity and art markets, see Onofri, 2003(a) 
and (b)). The impact of patents will be formalised in terms of their specific effects on the parties 
and considerations, and respective impacts on the costs and benefits for all the involved contractors. 
In the next subsections, we shall identify and assess the magnitude of such impacts.  
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4.1 Modelling the biodiversity seller’s objective function 
Given the condition that biological material suppliers voluntarily accept contractual bioprospecting 
activities, the contract supply function for the biodiversity sellers (BS) can be formally expressed by 
equation (1): 
 




As we can see, the contract supply function is modelled as dependent (a) on the stock of genetic 
material available to the seller, denoted by s; (b) on the human efforts, denoted by L; and 
technology, denoted by T. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the seller does not pursue 
autonomous R&D activities, meaning that T is not a direct control variable. However, it can benefit 
from non-monetary sharing-benefits, such as technology transfer (e.g. funding of laboratory 
equipment, modifications and maintenance; funding of computer system), that may come along 
with the signature of the contract, and for this same reason T is modelled as dependent on B, the 
amount of the parties’ bioprospecting effort (resulting in a number of pre-screened samples to trade 
with the buyer) as established in the contract. Similarly, the signature of the contract can also 
provide non-monetary benefits by improving the quality of the human capital employed in the 
screening sampling process (e.g. formal training at local Universities and access to scientific 
literature). Furthermore, here  () T L θ θ θ , ≡  denotes a vector portraying a set of idiosyncratic 
characteristics associated with the seller supply, including the quality of the local labour involved in 
the sampling procedures,  L θ ; the degree of access to technology as well as the quality of genetic 
material collected from the source country,  T θ . These characteristics will be embedded in the 





the seller’s bargaining power and the price of the contract
9. At this stage, we can model the 
expected profits
10 of the BS as follows: 
 




In first term in equation (2), pB denotes the price of the contract. As explained before, price is 
assumed to be dependent on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BS. The second term captures 
the production and transaction costs. This term includes the costs regarding the access to the 
resources (e.g. when the material is not at the seller’s disposal this may refer to the costs of the 
negotiations for authorisations with the local communities), the costs of labour and technology 
employed by the seller, as well as the costs of negotiating, writing and enforcing the bioprospecting 
contract. We assume that the cost function is characterised by economies of scale. In particular, we 
assume that δC/δB > 0 and  δ
2C/δB
2> 0. 
Finally, the last term in equation (2), denotes the royalty benefits on the basis of the expected 
value of a successful pharmaceutical product derived from the supplied patented compounds. The 
parameter μ (with 0 < μ ≤ 1) represents the share from patent revenues that the BS will receive. 
Against this background, the BS maximises its profits by choosing inter alia the amount of parties’ 
bioprospecting effort as established in the contract, i.e. B. Formally, we have  
                                                 
9 In this paper, the issue of the contractors’ bargaining power is voluntarily left as an “open” matter because of our 
selected methodological inductive approach. We attempt to capture common features in selected, very different 
bioprospecting contracts (whose parties will have different bargaining power, case by case).  An alternative 
methodological approach is the one provided by Gatti et al. (2005), that employ cooperative bargaining theory, to 
examine whether bioprospecting contracts create incentives for protection of rich biodiversity lands. Building on Nash’s 
idea of ‘rational threats’, the authors demonstrate that rather than removing the strategic incentives in the game of 
surplus division, current arrangements may, in fact, generate such incentives.  
10 Generally speaking, patenting may also cover a class of genetic materials and their broad applications (Lawson 2004). 
It must therefore lead to a more active patenting behavior in response to the application or imitation of the patented 
inventions by the external collaborators and competitors. Therefore, the BS has the possibility to patent new biological 
components discovered during the screening process. This is not modeled because it is not the object of the formal 


































































In other words, the optimal B
*  for the BS must satisfy equation (4). Equation (4) states that the 
seller is willing to write the bio-prospecting contract until the marginal benefits resulting from this 
action are equal to the marginal costs. According to equation (4), the marginal benefits are captured 
by two separate components: non-monetary benefit transfer and contract price. The first component 





















p θ θ . As we can see, this value depends on the qualitative changes 
of the value of productivity that the contract can bring along with it due to the transfer of 
technology and education. This magnitude is dependent on the parameters  L θ  and  T θ , and thus 
reflecting the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BS with respect to the two inputs under 
consideration. The second component refers to the potential effect of the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the BS on the definition of the price of the contract, signaling the seller’s 





 . The magnitude of these benefits needs to be compared with the 
marginal costs associated to parties’ bioprospecting effort, the negotiating, writing and enforcing of 





. Furthermore, we can highlight the following different scenarios regarding 
the magnitude of the two main effects of the benefit components:  24
































yBS , then we can 
interpret this situation as signalling that the BS strongly values the non-monetary benefits 
that the bioprospecting contract brings, even if the BS does not have a strong bargaining 
power. This situation is illustrated, for example, in the CSIR & Diversa contract (see Table 
1); 


























p θ θ , with 





















p θ θ , then we can interpret this scenario as signalling that the BS 
attaches a significant value to the monetary component of the marginal revenues from the 
contract. This situation is illustrated, for example, in the Yellowstone & Diversa, ICBG & 
Bristol-Myers Squibb-Monsanto-Glaxo Wellcome and European Botanical Gardens & US 
Phytera contracts (see Table 1).  
 
 
4.2 Modelling the biodiversity buyer’s objective functions 
The production function for the biodiversity buyer (BB) can be described by the following equation: 
 




in which, yBB is the yield of successfully developed drugs by the pharmaceutical company, 
which is modelled as a function of the screened genetic material supplied, as foreseen in the 
contract and denoted by yBS, the accumulated knowledge in the R&D process, denoted by K, and 
technological investments, denoted by TI. K has a positive effect on yBB since it plays an important 
role in increasing the probability of successfully developing new drugs. In a similar way, TI  
positively influences the productivity of the pharmaceutical industry. It however, relies on the  25
patentable innovations in the drug development process or the new products subject to the effort in 
writing a bioprospecting contract. For this reason, this effect is expressed in equation (5) as 
TI(pat(B)). Finally, the idiosyncratic characteristics of the BB are captured by the term σ  and can 
be interpreted inter alia in terms of the BB’s capability of undertaking R&D, market share in the 
world market of drugs and medicines (and embedded market power). Therefore, the objective 
function of the BB can be modelled as follows: 
 




The first term,  ⋅ D P () () ( ) () [] σ σ σ ; , ; , ; B pat TI B K B y G BS  in the equation (8) represents the total 
revenues of successful new drugs in the market.  D P  represents the market price of the drug, which 
is at this stage assumed to be exogenous to the BB (later we shall relax this assumption). The 
second term calculates the total costs incurred by the pharmaceutical company: C denotes the total 
costs, including the costs in purchasing screened samples from the BS, transaction costs, continual 
investments in R&D, and the costs of patent application and renewal fees for the new drug products. 
Finally,  () ( ) () [] σ μ ; 1 B pat Roy E −  is the BB’s share of the expected royalties. Hence, the company 






= BB π ⋅ D P () ( )( ) () [] σ σ σ ; , ; , ; B pat TI B K B y G BS ( )+ − pat TI B y C BS , , ,  





The three first order conditions are  




















































         






































































Therefore, the BB optimal levels of B
*, K
*, and the optimal effort in getting a patent, pat
* , must 
simultaneously satisfy equations (8)-(10). Equation (8) states that the BB intends to stipulate the 









































σ , plus the expected marginal revenues, 














E σ μ 1 , arising from the selling of drugs obtained by the 
transformation of the screened samples, which are purchased in the bioprospecting contract, can 





.  Equation (9) states that the optimal 
amount of investment is determined by the marginality condition. More interestingly, Equation (10) 
shows that the BB has the incentive to patent its new products, and pharmaceutical inventions, as 










, plus the additional, potential effect that patenting will bring on the expected 



















.  It is  27
clear from Equation (10) that patenting has a positive impact on investments in technology, since 
the research discoveries and pharmaceutical innovations are protected by the legislation. As a 
consequence, the large investments will bring about rapid progress in the present technology for 
drug development, which in turn, can increase the utilisation potential of genetic resources and their 
value due to the reduced time and costs in screening for pharmaceutical and other uses (Craft and 
Simpson 2001). Moreover, we can also consider the scenario where patenting may lead to create a 
monopolistic position for the BB. In this case, the BB will significantly increase its market power. 
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According to equation (11), patenting the new pharmaceutical products and innovations is 
responsible for the determination of a “monopolistic price overcharge”, whose magnitude is 
captured byλ , also denoted in the literature as price mark-up. Against this background, we can re-








































 Therefore, when the BB is legally allowed to patent the product, this effect can be used by the 
company as a tool to increase its market power, and thus earn greater profits. The magnitude of this  28
effect is given by  BB y
pat ∂
∂λ
. This constitutes an additional incentive for the private company to 
endorse R&D, which was not originally foreseen in equation (10).  
 
3.  Discussion of the impacts of bioprospecting contracts and patenting on welfare 
In the previous sections we have shown that bioprospecting contracts and patenting are significant 
variables affecting the objective functions of the parties under consideration. The prospect of higher 
individual profits, and market power, can stimulate the BS and BB to endorse bioprospecting and 
BB to endorse patenting. The following analysis will formally assess the total welfare impacts 
involved and their distribution among the stakeholders. Let us assume that the total welfare function 
is given by the following Samuelson-Bergson additive function:   
 
     BB BS W π π + =  +  () S y x v BB, ,  
    W () ⋅ = θ ; B pB () () ) ; ( ), ; ( , θ θ θ B T B L s F () B T L s CBS , , , −   ( ) [ ] pat Roy E ⋅ +μ  +                          
     +  () pat y P BB D , () () ( ) () [] σ σ σ ; , ; , ; B pat TI B K B y G BS ⋅ ( ) pat TI B y C BS BB , , , − + 
     +() ( ) () [] σ μ ; 1 B pat Roy E −  +  () ( ) B pat B y x v BB , ; , 
 
with PD > pB 
or, 
W  =   () ⋅ pat y P BB D , () () ( ) () [] σ σ σ ; , ; , ; B pat TI B K B y G BS ( ) B T L s CBS , , , −   ( ) pat TI B CBB , , −  +    













11 shows that the welfare function is given by the aggregation of BS and BB 
objective functions. In addition, we also consider the consumer’s utility expressed in monetary 
terms, denoted by v(.). The latter increases with the consumption of all other goods, x, and the 
consumption of pharmaceutical products, whose market is characterised by monopolistic power due 
to patenting. Finally, the consumer’s utility is also modelled as depending on B, and this may be 
interpreted as signalling consumer’s motivation with respect to the writing of the bioprospecting 
contract in terms of its contribution to the provision of impure altruistic, and/or aesthetic and/or 
existence values. For example, this may reflect the consumer’s additional willingness to pay for the 
market drug in the scenario where he, or she, is guaranteed that the respective production process is 
characterised by the respect of the knowledge of local communities property rights. For this same 
reason, the consumer feels good when buying this product since he, or she, is also “buying” moral 
satisfaction or warm-glow as derived from such a “good” cause (see Andreoni 1990, Nunes and 
Schokkaert 2003). Alternatively, this effect may reward the producer’s effort to protect the 
degradation of local biodiversity and respective landscape, including avoiding bio-piracy
12 actions. 
It is important to note that the price of the bioprospecting contract, or the price of screened samples, 
pB, is assumed to be smaller than the price of the successfully developed drugs, PD, which embeds 
all the information and bio-technology values. The difference can be interpreted as added-value 
resulting from the efforts that the BS puts forward in order to improve the quality of biotic 
                                                 
11 Since the revenue of the BS corresponds to the BB costs of buying screened samples, we can eliminate the first term 
by deleting the BB cost component with respect to the yBS. 
12 As an example of biopiracy, we report the following case. In 1995 the U.S. Department of Agriculture and a 
pharmaceutical research firm received a patent on a technique to extract an anti-fungal agent from the Neem tree 
(Azadirachta indica), which grows throughout India. Indian villagers have long understood the tree's medicinal value. 
Although the patent had been granted on an extraction technique, the Indian press described it as a patent on the Neem 
tree itself; the result was widespread public outcry, which was echoed throughout the developing world. Legal action by 
the Indian government followed, with the patent eventually being overturned. Importantly, the pharmaceutical company 
involved in the Neem case argued that as traditional Indian knowledge of the properties of the Neem tree had never 
been published in an academic journal, such knowledge did not amount to "prior art" (prior art is the term used when 
previously existing knowledge bars a patent). In response to biopiracy threats such as this, India has been translating 
and publishing ancient manuscripts containing old remedies in electronic form. (see Sheva, 2006) 
  30
information contained in their supplied samples. As Swanson (1994)  noted, information and 
insurance values are connected with the quality of the genetic resources.  
 
A) The effects of the contract on social welfare: 
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Equation (14) shows that the bioprospecting contract has several welfare impacts. A close 
inspection of this equation shows that most of these are related to the objective function of the BB, 
see Equation (8). This means that, from the selected welfare perspective, all the benefits that the BS 
receives from the bioprospecting contracts are balanced by the BB costs of buying screened 
samples. Therefore, these benefits do not appear in (14), they are simple transfers. However, this 
component can be of relevance from a distributional point of view. Especially, when the social 
planner attaches a higher welfare weight to BS, including the evaluation of the non-monetary 
benefit-sharing effects accrued to the BS (e.g. technology transfer, internal personnel training, 
capacity-building, and sharing of research results and biological databases). However, this 
distributional welfare gain might generate additional and significant transaction costs (for instance, 
the costs of monitoring the contract execution and/or enforcing the contract). This might jeopardise  31
the efficiency of the governance structure and related efficiency gains and, in turn, drive the 
contractors to re-adapt to a new governance structure that tends to minimise transaction costs.      









































σ , which corresponds to the BB marginal 














E σ , which corresponds to the expected marginal royalty 
revenues, that will be distributed among the BS and BB according to the μ  share. The higher the 
μ , the higher the transfer of expected marginal royalty revenues to the BS. In addition, we can see 
that the contract has two effects on the consumer’s utility and, thus, welfare. First, such effects refer 















and the marginal effect of the bioprospecting contract on the production of drugs is also non-









 captures the marginal 
impacts of the bioprospecting contract in terms of impure altruistic, aesthetic and/or existence 










 show that contracting is a costly activity for 
both BS and BB, respectively, and thus negatively affects the welfare function.   
To conclude, the overall effect on social welfare is unknown, but most likely expected to be 
positive. This positive effect is strengthened by three main determinants: (1) the lower the 
transaction cost; (2) the higher the benefit of the contract in terms of BB productivity and potential 
royalty revenues; and (3) the higher the consumer’s valuation of the contract. The combination of 
these results confirms the theoretical validity of the stylised facts discussed in Section 2, where 
contracts were interpreted as cost-minimising governance structures to implement the CBD 
principle. Against this background, the suggested policy recommendation is to respect the ‘invisible  32
hand’ mechanism and let the contracts work, since according to TCE biodiversity sellers and 
biodiversity buyers are the most proper agents to efficiently adapt to transaction costs.  
 
B) The effects of patenting on social welfare: 



























































. This is interpreted as a negative impact on the social welfare and 
indicates the relevance of the costs of patent application and renewal fees for the new drug 










 refers to welfare benefits from patenting due to technological investments and 
respective productivity, and thus profitability, of the pharmaceutical sector. This may well signal 
the well-known literature effect that points out that patents create incentives for R&D (see Heller 
and Eisenberg 1998; Willison and MacLeod 2002). In this context, patents do encourage research 
and may be essential for the success of drug development (Peeters and Van Pottelsberghe De La 
Potterie 2006). Second, patenting is also responsible for the creation of a monopolistic market. A 
patent holder achieves the monopolistic profits by being the only producer of the products since the 
patent represents a legal barrier to entry. This effect is captured by  BB y
pat ∂
∂λ
, which is interpreted as 
having a positive impact on social welfare. On the other hand, the positive effects of patenting on 















 is negative since higher prices (and thus lower 
quantities) due to patenting and applied by the BB monopolist will negatively affect consumer 
surplus.
13 Finally, the patenting generates a financial revenue in terms of royalty payments, captured 





, which is interpreted as having a positive impact on social welfare. From the 
theoretical point of view, we cannot establish a priori the overall effect (sign) of patenting on social 
welfare. The respective magnitude is a matter of empirical research.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The present paper contains an economic analysis of bioprospecting contracts. Given the background 
information of pharmaceutical research and related bioprospecting activities, we first reviewed a 
number of existing contracts worldwide in order to identify the main provisions and parties, namely 
biodiversity seller (e.g. local governmental and/or international research institution) and 
biodiversity buyer (e.g. private pharmaceutical company). Furthermore, we interpreted contracts in 
the perspective of transaction costs theory. We then identified the pharmaceutical industry as a 
private sector involved in bioprospecting activities, representing the largest global market of genetic 
resource products. For this same reason, this stakeholder is identified as having an important role in 
formulating the current bioprospecting contracts on the commercial use of genetic resources. Hence, 
we shifted our research emphasis on the pharmaceutical industry.  
By clarifying the pharmaceutical research process and the specific contractors, we gained 
insight into the contract contents and the bioprospecting activities. These studies provide the 
grounds for modelling the contractors’ objective functions and respective welfare impacts. Our 
analysis provided the following results. First, long-term bioprospecting contracts were found to be 
                                                 
13 Furthermore, since patenting is here associated to the presence of a bioprospecting contract, in order to derive the net 
consumer surplus one needs to take into account the positive effects in to consumers in terms of impure altruistic, 
aesthetic and/or existence values, as described in the previous paragraph.  34
an efficient transaction cost-minimising governance structure for the involved parties. Second, 
modelling bioprospecting contracts has allowed us to create an original theoretical framework, that 
explains the observed stylised facts, and to study and capture the different components of the 
parties’ objective functions. Third, comparative static analysis revealed that the governance 
structure has different, mixed impacts on social welfare. This is because the positive impacts 
delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a new drug 
product, productivity gains, non-monetary benefit sharing or transfers and royalty revenues. The 
negative welfare impacts are derived from patenting activities which allow the legal creation of a 
monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the potential 
redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective may jeopardise the 
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